is to improve market efficiency. Specifically, reguladon is directed at achieving an appropriate balance between encouraging efficient manage ment and ensuring a sound investor protecdon regime, pardcularly for mi nority investors.
According to die Commonwealdi Treasurer, Peter Costello (1997) , CLERP is a program to modernise Australia's Corporadons Law and give it an economic focus. ...[Itsl aim is to introduce world's best pracdce in busi ness reguladon. It is part of die government's broader goal of making Aus tralia a leading financial centre in die region. CLERP is designed to har monise Corporadons I^iw widi pro-enterprise, pro-jobs and pro-investment objecdves.
In this ardcle, it is argued dial die provisions of the Corporadons I^aw impede die achievement of its objecdves widi respect to takeovers. The focus on equity and disclosure discourages economic efficiency, to die detriment of small shareholders, by not giving appropriate recognition to die costs of acquiring informadon about die potendal target. Under die exisdng laws governing takeovers and die reforms sug gested by CLERP, an acquiring firm must equitably share die gains among all shareholders of die target company, not just diose controlling die target company. It must also disclose to die public its informadon about die target. But this dilutes die benefits of searching for profitable targets, widiout commensurately sharing die search costs. This must discourage takeovers from occurring in cases where all die
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potential gains may be diluted, so leaving control of the potential target remains with the incumbent management. But efficiency requires that assets should be con trolled by investors who can make the best use of them.
If CLERP is to achieve its goals, its proposals for takeover regulation need to go further. In particular, the Corporations I^aw would make a more effective contri bution towards shareholder equity if it focused on defending rather than eroding the property rights of shareholders.
The CLERP Proposals on Takeover Regulation
Australian government regulation of takeovers has, since die early 1960s, vacillated between attempts at rigid control and a practically laissez-faire approach. It is not just government Uiat has been inconsistent. On 24 April 1986, The Australian Fi nancial Review ran an editorial which labelled as 'futile' and 'dangerous' a justreleased study on takeovers because 'it may be used to justify increased regulation of takeovers'. This was alarming because 'policies Uiat hinder takeovers quite sim ply prevent resources being used by Uiose who can get die most of them'. Five years later, on 21 May 1991, The Australian Financial Review had turned full cir cle. Its editorial claimed dial 'takeover raids, even unsuccessful ones, can have a painfully corrosive effect on companies, morale often suffers and industrial per formance flags. ... The intangible cost of diverted management attention and stuldfied growth is unlikely ever to be known'. It is difficult to explain diis substandal turnaround, since no major study on die effects of takeovers in Australia which might have caused a revision of opinion had been released since die date of die first editorial.
This variadon in elite views on die benefits of low barriers to entry in die mar ket for corporate control and die magnitude of die wealdi effects at stake underline die need for a coherent, consistent framework to evaluate regulatory policy in diis area. But CLERP does not inspire confidence diat die regulatory authorities have a clear framework in place. Its paper on corporate control begins, encouragingly, widi die claim diat 'die threat of takeover provides a strong incentive for company directors and management to use capital efficiendy. ... It provides market-based incentives to encourage adequate corporate performance and provides a penalty where diis is not achieved ' (pp. 7-8) . The implication of this argument is diat die government should strive to eliminate impediments in die market for corporate control. But die proposed reforms fall well short of what could be done.
There are four principal reforms. These are:
• giving a specialist takeover panel die primary role in takeover dispute resoludon to improve efficiency and provide a commercial focus; • introducing a new compulsory acquisition power to allow any person who holds 90 per cent of a class of securities to acquire the remaining securities in that class at a fair price (whether or not a takeover bid has been made);
• extending the company takeover rules to listed managed investment schemes, so that listed-scheme managers face the same competitive pressure to perform, and unit holders have the same takeover protection, as companies; and
• introducing a mandatory-bid rule, which would allow a bidder to exceed the cur rent statutory shareholding threshold (currently 20 per cent of all shares in a class) before being obliged to make a general takeover offer.
1 he mandatory-bid rule is particularly significant because, if passed into law, it would substantially increase the rewards from identifying underperforming compa nies. Under current legislation, a potential acquirer is obliged to disclose to all in vestors valuable information about a target by making a public bid for all shares in the target once it has acquired 20 per cent of the target's ordinary shares. This promotes a public 'auction' for the target where the eventual winner is not necessar ily die company that first identified the target. Even if the firm that first identified a target manages to win its prize, the public auction will have forced it to concede a large proportion of its prospective gains from the purchase. The shareholders of potential target firms may appear to be the beneficiaries of die current system; but diey bear die opportunity cost of missing out on takeover bids from potendal ac quirers who are deterred by die high regulatory costs.
Ehe mandatory-bid rule (or, as it is sometimes termed, die 'follow-on rule') is consistent widi die government's avowed intention to promote market-based incen s e s to encourage adequate corporate performance. In this light, it is disappointing diat die mandatory-bid rule's potential to effect beneficial outcomes will be reduced by qualifying provisions diat restrict its application. For instance, potential bidders holding 20 per cent or more ol the target firm's shares will not be able to acquire control without making a public bid diat triggers a public aucdon for die target.
The Eggleston Principles
The principal stumbling blocks to an overhaul of existing policies in favour of diose diat would promote increased acfivity in die takeovers market are die four Eg gleston principles diat were, ironically, drafted widi die intention of protecting die interests ol target-firm shareholders, especially minority or non-controlling share holders. Radier dian challenging diem as sound guides to takeover regulation, CLERP's paper attempts to accommodate diem.
The four Eggleston principles are as follows:
1. die bidder's idendty should be known to shareholders and directors of die tar get;
2. shareholders and directors of the target should have a reasonable time to con sider die bid;
3. die bidder should give sufficient informadon to die shareholders to enable diem to form a judgment on die merits of die bid (die 'disclosure principle'); and 4. each shareholder should have an equal opportunity to pardcipate in die benefits offered under a bid (die 'equal opportunity principle').
The four principles are discussed in order of importance.
The disclosure principle. The CLERP paper recognises diat die disclosure prin ciple stems from a presumpdon diat legisladon should require a uniform distribudon of informadon among the participants in die market for corporate control. It argues diat 'Aldiough diere are costs of disclosure, diey are clearly outweighed by die benefits of facilitating an efficient market and protecting investors' (p. 10). Im portantly, die costs of disclosure are borne entirely by die bidder: 'Prospective bid ders can expend substantial resources identifying underpriced companies and de termining how management can be improved. ... These search costs may not be able to be recovered by die bidder, particularly if a rival bidder acquires die com pany. In such a case, die rival bidder will "free-ride" on the search costs paid by the initial bidder' (p. 9). The concern widi ensuring informational balance among bidders and die shareholders of their target firms reflects a confusion between die ideal of efficient markets and the processes diat contribute towards market efficiency. Efficient mar kets incorporate several desirable attributes, including dial prices reflect available information. However, information is cosdy and will not be produced unless there is an appropriate return. As die paper recognises, the incentive to produce such information is reduced, if not eliminated, by forcing bidders to broadcast valuable private information widiout allowing diem to capture die gains. W hat appears not to be appreciated is diat target shareholders are diereby deprived of one of die principal market mechanisms dial assist them in ensuring dieir firms' managers turn in 'an adequate corporate performance'. The requirement for informational bal ance among bidders and target firms' shareholders effectively undermines die mar ket for corporate control by imposing a substantial barrier to entry.
The equal opportunity principle. The primary motivation of die equal opportunity principle was apparendy a concern about promoting 'fairness and encouraging in vestor confidence in die market' (p. 11). The paper notes dial the equal opportu nity principle is 'an integral element of die takeover provisions of die Corporations I.aw. ... Even if diere is no breach of die takeover provisions, depriving sharehold ers of an equal opportunity to participate in benefits accruing from a bid may consti tute "unacceptable circumstances", leading to a referral to die Panel' (p. 11). It goes on to assert that 'Without die investor protection provided by die equal opportunity principle, it may be less likely that smaller investors would invest directly in the market, which could affect market liquidity and confidence ' (p. 14) .
Since critics of the equal opportunity principle risk being unfairly tarred with tlie same brush as misogynist critics of motherhood, it is important to clarify what is meant or intended by the term 'equality of opportunity'. The paper's discussion implies that equality of benefits or outcomes will reflect an equal opportunity envi ronment; and this presumption informs its view of what the appropriate regulation should be. However, in an equal opportunity environment investors will devote different amounts of resources to gathering information; and their returns will, on average, reflect their different levels of investment. This line of reasoning suggests that insisting on equality of outcomes is not merely inequitable but also inefficient, given that it eliminates investors' incentives to gather costly information.
Because of its uncritical acceptance of the equal opportunity principle, the pa per docs not canvass the equity implications of depriving the controlling sharehold ers of their property rights to the premium for control paid by the acquirer, al though it does acknowledge that the principle 'could result in a lower premium ob tainable by controlling shareholders, where the bidder decides to pay the same total premium and distribute it amongst all target shareholders' (p. 15). In sum, the dis cussion begs the question whether the investor who purchases a non-controlling parcel of shares in a company and who holds them passively is entided to a propor tionate share of die premium for control. Arguably, equity requires diat die endre premium for control should accrue only to die shareholders who can deliver con trol of die target company.
It is also notewordiy diat die paper does not provide any evidence to support the claim diat smaller investors exert a significant influence on market liquidity or confidence. On die face of it, die equal opportunity principle acts to reduce radier dian increase small investors' confidence, by decreasing dieir access to die market for corporate control. However, die paper does attend to die efficiency implicadons of die equal opportunity principle. It states dial 'the equal opportunity prin ciple potendaily creates higher costs for market participants, reducing incendves to engage in takeover aedvity. Without the principle, takeover costs could be lower, dicreby increasing incendves to bid for a target company and leading to greater effi ciency dirough die prospect of increased takeover aedvity' (p. 15). But it is dien argued diat die increase in shareholder protecdon afforded by die principle gives rise to greater investor confidence, die benefits of which outweigh die costs.
It is difficult to appreciate how reducing shareholders' access to die market for corporate control can serve to increase dieir confidence. As noted earlier, die pa per explicidy recognises diat an aedve market for corporate controls reduces inves tors' exposure to die risk of managers pursuing non-value-maximising behaviour; yet it does not consider die cost of losing diis benefit when evaluating the net attracdon to investors of die equal opportunity principle.
Commendably, die paper does acknowledge dial die equal opportunity princi ple is not die only means by which die interests of small (or 'retail') investors can be protected. Retail investors can choose to invest in managed funds or may reduce 'the risk of becoming a minority shareholder unable to sell their shares at the pretakeover price' by diversifying their funds. However, the paper argues that diversifi cation 'would be a second best alternative to the equal opportunity principle as, in practical terms, diversification can be difficult to achieve without incurring substan tial costs' (p. 15). Again, no evidence is provided in support of the assertion, which is questionable given the availability and potential for growth in pooled investment funds.
In sum, it is difficult to agree with the paper's conclusion that 'The equal oppor tunity principle enhances aspects of the market that are essential: market integrity and investor protection' (p. 16). The arguments for the opposing view are more convincing.
The regulations stemming from the application of the disclosure and equal op portunity principles impose the largest direct costs oil bidders seeking to enter the market for corporate control. The indirect but nevertheless real costs are borne by die target shareholders. These indirect costs may be higher than the direct costs, given that bidders have alternative investment opportunities.
The revelation o f identity principle. The first Eggleston principle -that the bid der's identity be known to shareholders and directors of the target -is embodied in provisions of the Corporations I.aw such as those affecting substantial sharehold ers. Under these provisions, investors are required to lodge a noüce that they are substantial shareholders once they are aware that they have a relevant interest in 5 per cent or more of the total number of shares issued by a company. The notices have a significant impact; substantial shareholder notices are interpreted by the market as signalling takeover intentions, and dieir filing by firms active in takeovers tends to drive up the share price of the prospective target firm.
As with all legislation that effects wealth transfers, the provisions concerning substantial shareholder notices benefit some stakeholders at the expense of others. The direct costs of the principle are borne by the substantial shareholders who fail to capture the full benefit from their information. Prospective target-firm share holders gain from the knowledge that an oiler for their shares is more than likely imminent. Although, from an economy-wide perspective, the first Eggleston prin ciple may appear to exhibit the properties of a zero-sum game because the profits from the increase in information are not lost but partially transferred to the target shareholders, the fact is that depriving substantial shareholders of the full gains from the information decreases their incentives to search for information in the first place. The long-term effect is a decrease in the efficiency of resource allocation as less information is produced. Further, the long-run effects are also negative for tar get shareholders, given that die reduction in information about firms leads to a de creased incidence of takeover bids.
The ceiling for notification of substantial shareholder status has been reduced from a 10 per cent ownership level to 5 per cent. The decrease has made die pro visions more expensive to comply widi and more expensive to administer; it has also made it more difficult for bidders to capture die full gain from information.
Given these costs, the alleged benefits of the 5 per cent rule relative to the previous 10 per cent rule should be re-evaluated.
The reasonable time principle. The Eggleston principle that shareholders and directors of the target have a reasonable time to consider the bid is operationalised by die requirement in the Corporations l,aw that bidders keep their offers open for at least one month during the formal offer period, which begins 14 days alter die takeover announcement. In effect, die Corporadons Law forces bidders to write a lree put option at no cost to die shareholders of die target company for a whole six weeks; diat is, the law compels bidders to maintain a minimum price for die target's shares lor die duradon of die offer, a right which is valuable to die target sharehold ers hut lor which diey bepj-no obvious cost. But of course diey do bear a cost, implicit in a lower bid price, or, in some cases perhaps, no bid at all.
Surely, six weeks to evaluate die merits of an offer is far longer dian is com mercially reasonable in today's market. A reduedon to 14 days in die formal offer period would lower die cost to die bidder widiout prejudicing die target sharehold ers' ability to evaluate die offer. Regardless of die amount of dine available to shareholders to evaluate an offer, it is always in dieir interests to delay making a de cision undl die last moment, because accepdng it can kill the opdon. The tendering ol acceptances late in die sdpulated offer period should never be seen as evidence diat die whole period was required properly to evaluate die offer. It is typically die opdmal response to any normal bid.
Evaluating Barriers to Entry in the Market for Corporate Control
Corporate takeover bids are frequent occurrences. Argus and Finn (1992) report diat between 1971 and 1990 up to 16 per cent ol all listed companies were subject to a takeover bid in a given year. That is an underestimate of die number of listed firms involved in takeover activity, since many ol diem bid lor companies diat are unlisted or toreign-based. Over die past decade, a large majority of die top 100 firms in terms ol market capitalisation made at least one acquisition diat exceeded 10 per cent of dieir market capitalisation.
I he high incidence ol takeover bids indicates diat investors, as a whole, have ample opportunities to develop expertise in evaluating bids and dierefore can ap propriately price die shares of the companies involved in diem. Expansion by merger is not an exceptional event but an integral element of die investment plans 01 most successful companies. Further, aldiough managerial hubris and aggran disement may motivate some acquisitions, takeover activity is too broadly based among successful companies to sustain die charge diat diey are its principal spur. In any event, investor reaction to takeover bids permits a direct test of die manage- rial bubris-cum-aggrandisement hypothesis. If hubris is a principal motivation, we would expect die share returns to acquiring firms to decline on announcement of a takeover hid. (We review die Australian evidence below.)
The high incidence of takeover bids may suggest dial perhaps die barriers to entry in die market for corporate control are not substandal and diat dieir associ ated efficiency costs are dierefore not substandal eidier. The flaw in this argument is diat high barriers to entry in die market for corporate control do not endrely preclude entry. However, high barriers ensure diat only takeovers offering die op portunity to reap egregiously large profits will be contemplated by a potendal ac quirer. High barriers to entry deprive shareholders of die opportunity to profit from a reallocadon of corporate assets diat yields a net gain that is less dian die cost of overcoming die barriers.
It is difficult to derive a direct esdmate of die cost of barriers to entry in die market for corporate control. However, die sharemarket performance of target firms reladve to diat of odier firms in die pre-bid period provides one indirect measure of dieir high cost. The high level of prospeedve profits required to make a firm attraedve to a potendal acquirer is more likely to be available in firms diat are substanUally underperforming reladve to odier firms, so evidence of substandal underperformance by firms diat are subsequendy the subject of takeover bids is con sistent widi die existence of high barriers to entry. This is because, in a takeover market widi no barriers to entry, investors will andcipate diat underperformance dial may be remedied by takeover will not persist and so die share returns of po tential target firms will not substanUally underperform die rest of die market in die pre-bid period.
Sharemarket-based Evidence
Sharemarket-based evidence is relevant to die debate over die market lor corporate control because die focus of die takeover provisions of die Corporadons I.aw is on delivering equitable sharemarket outcomes to die shareholders of target firms. W hen evaluadng die evidence, it is important to bear in mind that studies of inves tors' responses to corporate events such as takeover bids do not assume that mar kets are omniscient or unfailingly prescient. The cridcal assumpdon is diat market participants evaluate companies' prospects in an unbiased fashion and have strong modvadons to do so. Given die intense compeddon to achieve opportunities for abnormal gain in die sharemarket, we may confidendy expect diat any systematic bias in the evaluation of companies' prospects will not persist.
Notwithstanding the above, sceptics of die utility of sharemarket-based studies may point to die now well-established body of evidence diat indicates die apparent existence of market inefficiency, defined as die persistent opportunity to earn posi tive abnormal returns from relatively freely available information. Among the earli est and best-publicised of diese alleged anomalies is die so called 'size effect', which refers to a systematic negative association between firm size and return, even alter controlling for risk and odier apparendy relevant factors.
Investigation into market anomalies is an intriguing area of research in finance because the anomalies defy obvious explanation. However, it is pertinent that de spite the venerable age (by the yardstick of financial markets) of many of the alleged anomalies, none of the publicised ones has passed the ultimate test: the ability per sistently to achieve for investors positive abnormal returns when investing real dol lars. Reports that less than hall of investment-fund managers outperformed the All Ordinaries Index in the 1997 calendar year indicate that market efficiency, defined as tiie unbiased pricing of companies' prospects, is die depressing or reassuring (depending on one's approach to selecting stocks) reality for the overwhelming majority of investors.
Notwithstanding that investor experience indicates that the 'anomalous' empiri cal regularities in share returns cannot be exploited to achieve persistent abnormal returns, it is apparent that share market studies that use historical data need to con trol for diese regularides when assessing investor reacdon to corporate events. This is die approach die present audiors adopted in reviewing the shareholder wealth consequences of takeover acdvity by firms listed with die Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) (Brown &. da Silva Rosa, 1997) . Our study measured die abnormal per formance of a virtually exhaustive sample of die ASX-listed firms diat were involved in takeover bids between 1975 and 1990. Each sample firm's performance was as sessed over two disdnct periods: a pre-bid announcement period, defined as the dine spanning diree years prior to six months before die month of die takeover bid announcement; and a bid announcement period, defined as die seven months cen tred on die month in which die takeover bid was announced (diat is, die bid period begins diree months before die month in which die takeover bid was announced and ends diree months after it). 1 hese operational definitions are consistent widi diose adopted in similar studies and were based on a judgment diat die sample firms' pre-bid period performance did not incorporate takeover-related price ef fects, while their performance over the bid period includes most of the takeoverrelated impact on share price. 1 arget firms' pre-bid performance was unambiguously poor. The sample of l,o71 target firms on average lost 23.3 per cent over die pre-bid period, after con trolling for market wide and size-related movements in share prices. This poor per formance was reversed on die announcement of a takeover bid. Over die bid an nouncement period, die target firms gained, on average, 25.5 per cent, after con trolling for all non-takeover related factors. This translates into a gain of $15 billion returned to die shareholders of die sample of target firms direedy as a result of takeover acdvity. Bidding firms also did well out of takeovers. Their takeoverrelated return around die bid announcement period averaged 5 per cent, which, given dieir market capitalisadon, corresponds to a gam of $5 billion. The results we reported are consistent widi diose of odier studies, such as Bishop, Dodd and Offi cer (1986) . Interesdngly, we did not find dial diese posidve returns were reversed in the mondis that followed die bid.
Summary and Conclusions
An active market for corporate control plays an important role in facilitating capital investment through its function as a monitoring and disciplinary mechanism. It protects investors' interests by providing potential bidders with incentives to search for opportunities to reallocate corporate assets to higher-valued uses. Takeovers create value through the removal of underperforming management or the exploita tion of potential synergy. The sharemarket evidence strongly supports this view.
The Corporations Law in Australia aims to improve efficiency in the market for corporate control by facilitating opportunities for efficient management and by pro viding a sound regulatory regime of investor protection. The investor-protection provisions are framed with reference to die four so-called Eggleston principles. However, die Eggleston principles result in confiscadng from bidding firms the benefits diat accrue from identifying underperforming corporate assets. The appro priated benefits are transferred to target shareholders. The presumably unintended consequence of such wealth transfers is diat die return to resources devoted to identifying underperforming assets is significandy reduced and corporate assets are not employed to dieir best economic advantage.
Reform of die takeover-related provisions of die Corporations Law aimed at protecting property rights to information would go a long way towards securing eq uity and efficiency in the market for corporate control.
